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STATEMENT OF BASIS FOR PETITION
The City is appreciative of the attention and courtesy extended by the court to the
parties at oral argument. However, the court's Opinion, filed one year thereafter, departs
from both the facts and law argued by the parties and relied upon by the lower court. The
passage of time and this detour from the refining process of briefing and argument resulted
in several errors of fact and law which, if corrected, should materially alter this court's
opinion.
These errors are not merely technical. They form the basis upon which the merits
of the entire action were avoided. They are thus fundamental to the rights of the parties.
They also involve important public policy as set forth more fully herein. Correction of these
errors will promote principles of justice, sound development and local governance.
Appellant respectfully requests that this court review the statutes and case law and
apply them to the actual record as discussed herein, and to grant appellant the opportunity
for oral argument on such issues as are presented in this petition, as provided in Rule 35
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH ZONING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTES
HAVE BEEN MISAPPREHENDED
A.

THE COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE JURISDICTIONAL NATURE
OF THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTE AND TO APPLY A
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO STATUTES OF THAT
CLASS.
Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 (1986) states that "[u]rban development shall not be

approved or permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated area
which the municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration."

"Urban development" is defined to include "a commercial or industrial development for
which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases."1
This statute limits Salt Lake County's jurisdiction territorially as well as in subject
matter. It expressly forbids the County to "approve or permit" commercial development in
excess of $750,000 within one-half mile of Sandy City. County ordinances also prohibit the
County from approving use permits which contradict the master plan.2
A central issue in Sandy City's appeal from summary judgment by the district court
is whether respondents' development exceeded $750,000 in costs so as to deprive the
County of approval authority. The County Director of Development Services, testifying
before the Planning Commission, confirmed that "when the entire site is developed it will
exceed the $750,000 figure."3 Developers testifying at that same hearing confirmed that
their costs for just the first two pads was $760,000.4 A later MAI appraisal showed that the
costs of the entire development indeed far exceeded the $750,000 urban development
restriction.5
Thus, the evidence before the County was entirely consistent - as it is before this
Court - the costs of the entire project will exceed $750,000. But, Salt Lake County is
subject to the same tendencies as other large bureaucracies — it seeks to maximize its own
interests and authority. Despite the testimony of the developers and its own staff, it found

1
2

UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(11) (1986).
R22.

3

Rill.

4

R108.

5

R133-135.
2

that development costs were less than $750,000.
On appeal, this Court acknowledged that it could consider whether the County
exceeded its authority under the Urban Development Statute, but refused to do so.6 It
cited Najior v. Salt Lake City Corporation7 for the proposition that the court should not
substitute its judgment for that of the County on the merits of such an issue.
The Na)lor case does not support such a conclusion. The statutory authority of the
City was not in question there. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he statutory
authority of the City's governing body to enact zoning ordinances and amending the same
is not questioned" in that case.8 Thus the Nayior court merely confirmed that courts should
not ordinarily interfere with matters of administrative discretion.
Statutory authority is the central issue in the instant appeal. Jurisdictional issues are
not discretionary and judicial deference has no proper place where the County lacks
authority to act. The Supreme Court has confirmed that review latitude is recognized only
where counties act within their authority:
"County zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of the
applicable zoning ordinances, and are not at liberty either to grant or deny
conditional use permits in derogation of legislative standards. Within the
boundaries established by such standards, however, the zoning authority is
afforded a broad latitude of discretion, and its decisions are afforded a strong
presumption of validity. Where such decisions have been made, courts will
not interfere unless they are plainly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable or an
abuse of discretion."9

6

Opinion, p. 11.

7

16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29 (Utah 1965).

8

7d., at p. 28.

9

Thurston v. Cache Qyt 626 P2d 440, 444-445 (Utah 1981). Emphasis added. See also Peatross v. Board
of County Commissioners, 555 PJ2d 281 (Utah 1976), where the Court made clear that deference will be granted
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard only if the lower agency was "acting within the scope of its
authority."

3

There is hardly a more important issue before any court than the unlawful use of
governmental power. Courts have been established to check such excesses. Salt Lake
County and its planning commission are agencies of limited jurisdiction. Their "authority"
is dependent entirely upon the terms of the statutes reposing power in them. They cannot
confer jurisdiction on themselves by making findings contrary to the evidence before them.
If the mandatory provisions of their enabhng statutes are not met, they have no authority
to proceed.
The review standard applied in this appeal reverses the proper role of the courts.
Instead of serving as a check on governmental excesses, it becomes the validator of the
same. It permits administrative agencies to define their own powers in the face of evidence
which consistently denies them such powers.

The Court of Appeals could not have

intended to play such a role or create such a profound precedent. The City requests that
the court reconsider the review standard it so broadly applied in this appeal.
. B.

THE MUNICIPAL CODE AND BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT STATUTES
RELIED ON BY THE COURT HAVE NO APPLICATION WHATSOEVER TO
REZONINGS BY ELECTED COUNTY OFFICIALS.
The court cited two statutes selected from the Utah Municipal Code and one statute

from the enabling act for counties, as the basis for its refusal to review the merits of this
appeal.10 These statutes have no application to this appeal for the following reasons:
UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-16. This statute was cited to establish that "an appeal
from a zoning decision must be made within the time and according to the procedure

0

Copies of each of these statutes are attached as Appendix "A."
4

specified by the board of county commissioners."11 More specifically, this section provides
a procedure for appealing alleged errors in zoning enforcement decisions to the board of
adjustment.
The record does not disclose whether Salt Lake County has ever appointed a board
of adjustment. If it has, its members are not elected officials - they are appointed by the
coimty commission.12 For this reason, they do not review zoning decisions.13 Their powers
are expressly limited to considering alleged errors "in the enprcement of the zoning
resolution."14
The City does not allege an error in zoning enprcement. It attacks the jurisdiction
of the County to adopt the zone itself and to issue the attendant conditional use permit.
As such, Section 17-27-16 has no application and should not have been applied to avoid
consideration of the merits of this appeal.
The Appellate Court's interpretation also contravenes Utah case law. For instance,
the Utah Supreme Court has approved a county commission's decision to not bestow on the
board of adjustment the power to issue special zoning exceptions. The county commission
elected to wield such power on its own. The Court emphasized that "the Board of
Adjustments is constituted by statute a forum for review of all administrative zoning
decisions, but nowhere is it made the exclusive repository of appellate powers."15

11

Opinion, footnote 1. A copy of this statute appears on Appendix "A."

12

UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-15.

13

Zoning is generally considered to be an act which is legislative in nature. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust
Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724, 725 (1939); Gayiand v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 635
(1961); Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engl Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976).
14

UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-16(1). Emphasis added.

15

Thurston, supra, p. 446. Emphasis added.
5

Serious problems will result if the instant interpretation remains. The Court's
conclusion that zoning challenges must pursue board of adjustment appeal transfers
legislative policymaking powers from the elected officials of the County to a board which
is not responsible to the electorate. Such a construction poses immense governance
problems and promotes conflicts with the goals and objectives of local communities as
articulated by their elected representatives.

Under the restrictive standard of review

imposed by the Court in this appeal, the public would have virtually no ability to overturn
a zoning by such a non-elected body. Such a serious precedent should not have been
established without some briefing or oral argument by the parties.
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-9. This statute was cited by the Court as a second basis
for its conclusion that the City did not timely appeal the County's zoning decision.16 This
section is part of the Utah Municipal Code. It establishes a procedure for appeals to city
board of adjustments from administrative decisions by city officials.

This section has

nothing to do with appeals from county zoning decisions whatsoever and should not be
applied to this case.17
Even if this section were somehow to relate to counties, it does not apply here. Like
the County's board of adjustment statute,18 it addresses only to appeals from enprcement
decisions and does not authorize the board of adjustment to invalidate the actual zones
themselves. Further, this section does not establish any time limits whatsoever for appeals.

Opinion, p. 15. A copy of the statute prior to the 1989 amendment is in Appendix "A."
17

See Davis County v. Qearfeld Gty, 756 P.2d 704, 706-707 (Utah App. 1988), where the Court of Appeals
rejected a similar attempt to impute the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act to municipal
planning matters.
18

See Section 1, above.
6

Section 10-9-9 is facially inapplicable to this action and should not be used as the
basis to avoid consideration of the merits of this appeal. Further, application of that
section in this appeal poses the same legal and governance problems as use of the County
board of adjustment statute. Its retention in the Court's decision will create a precedent
of serious consequence.
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-15. This statute was also used to establish that the City
had failed to make a timely administrative appeal from the County's rezoning.19 This
section does set a 30-day appeal period - but it is for appealing decisions by city boards of
adjustments to the district court. Like section 10-9-9, it is part of the Utah Municipal Code
and applies only to cities. Counties are not municipalities for the purposes of that code and
this section has nothing to do with County zoning decisions whatsoever.20 Even if it did
apply to counties, it does not purport to establish a time-limitation for appeals of rezoning
decisions.
The immediate effect of these errors is to deny the parties consideration of
the merits of this appeal. The long-term effect is greater. If permitted to stand, this
decision will create confusion of governance principles and likely undermine the ability of
citizens to implement their goals and objectives through their elected officials in many
communities of our state.

Opinion, p. 15. A copy of this statute is in Appendix "A.M
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(1).
7

POINT II
THE FACTUAL RECORD HAS BEEN MISSTATED
A

SANDY'S OBJECTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT WERE TIMELY AND
COMPLETE
The Appeal Court's decision acknowledges that Sandy objected to the County's

rezoning but states that such objection was untimely and incomplete. That conclusion
arose partly from misapplication of the statutes discussed in Point I above. However, some
misconstruction of the factual record was also implied in the conclusion. As shown below,
the actual appeal record does not support this criticism:
1.

There is no record that the City received notice of the rezoning hearing.21

The County only provided the City with a copy of the rezoning application and requested
its recommendation.22

The zoning application omitted the estimate of project value

required by the application form. But it did admit that the rezoning would not comply
with the County's current land use plan.23 To this admission, the City's objection added
that the plan also violated the City's Comprehensive Plan and the Crescent Community
Citizen's Report.24
2.

There was "not a specific use proposed for the overall properties" at the time

the application was made25 or when rezoning was considered.26 Value would not be

Although there is a record of constructive notice to the public. Envelope 5, Doc. 2.
^RIS-H.

24

R17.

25

R15.

26

Envelope 5, Document 6, p. 904.
8

determined until a building permit was actually issued.27 It would have been impossible for
the City to have estimated the cost of development at that time.28 Even though there was
no project information available, the City could still inform the County that n[t]he developer
should seek annexation and zoning from Sandy." This is exactly what the City did.29
3.

At the hearing on the matter, the Coimty Commission was briefed on Sandy's

objection to the rezoning.30 The Deputy County Attorney advised the Commission that
there may be a problem with the development meeting the urban development restrictions
of section 10-2-418 U.C.A, depending on how the development plans were eventually
presented. He then stated that "Sandy could object to that anyway," presumably at the
time the plans were submitted.31
4.

Based on representations of the Deputy Coimty Attorney and other staff

members, the County Commission approved the rezoning.32 The ordinance was published
on August 20, 1987.33
5.

Within thirty days thereafter, the City petitioned the County for a rehearing

of its zoning decision.34 That petition reiterated that "[development on the property would

^ Rill. Also, Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 13.
28

The proposal was so loose that County staff reported "there is a possibility that the developer will ask for
a different zone depending on the market." The zoning was thereupon approved by the County Commission
without any knowledge of actual uses to be placed on the property.
29

R17.
Envelope 5, Document 6.

31

Id., p. 906.

32

Id., pp. 906-907.

9

constitute 'urbam development' and that the property owners had not attempted to annex
the property to Sandy City as required by 10-2-418, U.C.A 1953." The petition also stated
that M[t]he granting of the RM/zc and C-2 zoning on this property contradicts the Little
Cottonwood District Development Plan which calls for rural residential use on the
property."35
6.

The County Commission reviewed the City's petition but did not permit City

representatives to speak.36 The Commission denied the City's request and directed that if
the City wished to pursue its objection, it should do so before the Planning Commission
through the conditional use process.37
7.

The City complied with the County Commissions directive and took its protest

to the Planning Commission raising repeated objections to the statutory and master plan
violations described above.38 When that was unsuccessful, the City filed a timely appeal to
the County Commission as required by County ordinance.39 When its protests were rejected
there, the City promptly initiated this action in conformance with the process defined by the
County Attorney.40

35

Id,

36

T6. Also, Envelope 5, Document 7, p. 1190. Compare with Opinion which asserts that Sandy had "ample
opportunity to present evidence." p. 13.
37

Envelope 5, Documents 8 - 9 .

39

R22. County Ordinance 19.84.110 (Appeal of Planning Commission Decision).

40

"Mr. [Kent] Lewis responded if the conditional use is issued because they are convinced that it is not
covered by the half-mile (sic), then Sandy's option is to seek an injunction agains(sic) the developer and the
county and a legal determination could be made as to whether or not the half mile is applicable." Envelope 5,
Document 9, p. 1114.
10

The above chronology illustrates that (1) the City raised its development objections
prior to the County's rezoning hearing; (2) evidence of development costs was not available
to the City at the time of rezoning and could not have accompanied the City's objection;
(3) at the time of rezoning, the County understood that the project may violate urban
development restrictions; (4) the County nevertheless rezoned the property, deferring its
decision on the legal question and the City's objection to the development until a specific
development was proposed; (5) the City timely requested reconsideration of the County's
decision; (6) the request for zoning reconsideration was denied and the City was directed
to pursue its objection through the conditional use process; (7) the City complied with the
County's direction and fully participated at all stages of the conditional use process as
defined by ordinance; and (8) through this action, the City timely appealed the rezoning
and conditional use permits in the manner defined by the County Attorney.
Thus, the City was not remiss in raising objections or untimely in appealing this
development. The court's decision should be corrected to reflect the actual record of these
events and the merits of the City's appeal should be addressed in that process.
B.

THE COUNTY'S FINDINGS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
The Court of Appeals refused to consider any factual issues because the County had

made findings as to development costs which were "supported by evidence."41

This

conclusion is inaccurate. As stated above, the County's own staff testified that development
costs for the site would exceed $750,000:
"Ken Jones, Director of Development Services, said in the past the County
has not considered the value of the land because this varies from day to day,
however, the value of the development is determined when the building
permit is acquired. He would not want his staff to advise people to purchase

41

Opinion, p. 14.
11

a 10 acre parcel, get it zoned, and then cut it up to avoid annexation. In this
particular case it is safe to assume that when the entire site is developed it will
exceed the $750,000figure.This legal issue will have to be addressed with the
cooperation of Salt Lake County and Sandy City."42
The developers confirmed that they were in fact cutting up the parcel and that thencosts for just the first two of numerous building pads was $760,000.43 No evidence was
introduced to refute this testimony.44 The County's findings therefore directly contradict the
undisputed evidence and the appeal court's deference to such findings was misplaced. The
court's decision should be reconsidered in order to state the facts contained in the record
on appeal.
POINT III
THE COURTS DECISION WILL CAUSE
UNFAIRNESS IF NOT CORRECTED
The City respectfully suggests that the foregoing errors of law and fact will cause
unfairness to the parties if not corrected. The following are examples of this effect:
1.

The principle basis of the court's ruling was not raised as an affirmative

defense by any of the parties to this action, nor was it ever briefed, argued, or considered
by the parties, the agencies, or lower court. Thus, the parties have been entirely deprived
of the opportunity to address the issue upon which their rights were determined.

R i l l . Also, Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 13.
43

Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 10.

44

R108. Chevron agents did make statements as to costs on the first pad. However, they did not address
costs for the entire development. Further, such statements were without foundation and the County's findings
even as to that pad violated the "residuum of competent evidence rule." Utah courts have held that a residuum
of competent legal evidence must support findings of an administrative agency. This rule is discussed on p. 18
of Appellant's reply brief.
12

2.

The court's decision that the City should have followed some alternative

appeal procedure is contrary to the procedures outlined by the County to the City orally in
the record and by ordinance.

The City followed all those procedures and made its

objections in a timely fashion at each stage. Where the parties have agreed on an appeal
procedure which is consistent with all applicable statutes and ordinances, it promotes
unfairness to refuse rudimentary discovery and, in fact, to invalidate an action on the basis
that an alternative procedure was not selected.

The court would advance justice by

providing the same presumption to the County's defined grievance procedure as it has to
all other aspects of the County's decisions.
3.

The court's decision to permit a local government to submit massive amounts

of evidentiary materials at summary judgment hearings, without advance notice to the
parties and without permitting a recess to review the same, and after the opposing party has
completed its briefing and oral argument, creates a precedent certain to undermine the
ability of future citizens to avoid the ambush inherent in such a procedure.45
4.

To conclude that the City "had sufficient time and opportunity during the

pendency of the action before the county commissions to develop and present evidence in
its favor and to determine and refute the defendants' evidence"46overlooks the fact that the
proposed projects had not been disclosed or that development costs were otherwise

The court seems to have assumed that the approximately six inches of documents submitted by the County
in this action were maintained by the County prior to the action in the same condition as they were presented
to the district court. That assumption is not supported by the record and is not accurate. The record was
assembled by the County from numerous sources for purposes of the summary judgment hearing. Some
selectivity is inherent in such a process as evidenced by the fact that the record was determined to be incomplete
when presented and had to be supplemented. If the county attorney was unable to locate all the relevant records
for the hearing it is difficult to see how a citizen of the county can be assumed to have complete advance
knowledge of the same.
Opinion, p. 13.
13

unavailable from the developers. It was the County, not the City, which failed in its burden
to require evidence of project costs and compliance with the master plan, so as to establish
a competent basis for its jurisdiction to proceed.47
5.

When the City was finally able to obtain a professional cost appraisal on its

own, demonstrating that the development would surely exceed $750,000, such estimates had
no effect on the County's decision to proceed with its approvals.48 To permit County
jurisdiction to be upheld solely on statements without competent evidentiary foundation
encourages the County to continue to ignore competent evidence when presented, contrary
to the facts and in its self interest.
6.

The court's conclusion that zoning challenger must pursue appeals to boards

of adjustment has the effect of transfering legislative policy-making powers from the elected
officials of the County to a board which is not responsible to the electorate. Such a
construction undermines representative government and separation of powers principles.
It also promotes administrative conflicts with the goals and objectives of local communities
as articulated by their elected representatives.

CONCLUSION
The Appellant thanks the court for the extensive time it has taken to review this
case and the courtesy provided to the parties at oral argument. However, on the basis of
the foregoing discussion, it is respectfully submitted that there are significant factual and

County ordinance 19.84.090 places the evidentiary burden on the county to demonstrate conformance with
the intent of the county master plan. R22.
48

Envelope 1, Document 11, p. 1389. (McDonald Appeal)
14

legal issues which compel a reconsideration of the court's decision. The Appellant also
believes that oral argument is appropriate in the circumstances as provided for in Rule 35
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DATED this

day of June, 1990.

Walter R. Miller
Sandy City Attorney

CERTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY
I, Walter R. Miller, attorney of record for Petitioner and Appellant, certify that this
petition is filed and presented in good faith and not for any purpose of delay.

Walter R. Miller
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APPENDIX "A"
10-9-9. Appeals to board — Time — Persons entitled —
Transmission of papers.
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved
or by any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality affected by
any decision of the administrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken within a
reasonable time as provided by the rules of the board by filing with the officer
from whom the appeal is taken and with the board of adjustment a notice of
appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom the appeal is
taken shall forthwith transmit to the board of adjustment all the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken.

10-9-15. Judicial review of board's decision — Time limitation.
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of
competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented to the
court within thirty days after the filing of such decision in the office of the
board.

17-27-15. Board of adjustment — Regulations — Meetings.
The board of county commissioners of any county which enacts zoning regulations under the authority of this act, shall provide for a board of adjustment
of three to five members and for the manner of the appointment of such
members. Not more than half of the members of such board may at any time
be members of the planning commission. The board of county commissioners
shall fix per diem compensation and terms for the members of such board of
adjustment, which terms shall be of such length and so arranged that the
term of at least one member will expire each year. Any member of the board of
adjustment may be removed for cause by the board of county commissioners
upon written charges and after a public hearing. Vacancies shall be filled for
the unexpired term in the same manner as in the case of original appointments. The board of county commissioners may appoint associate members of
such board, and in the event that any regular member be temporarily unable
to act owing to absence from the county, illness, interest in a case before the
board or any other cause, his place may be taken during such temporary
disability by an associate member designated for the purpose.
The board of county commissioners shall provide and specify in its zoning or
other resolutions general rules to govern the organization, procedure, and
jurisdiction of said board of adjustment, which rules shall not be inconsistent
with the provisions of this act, and the board of adjustment may adopt supplemental rules of procedure not inconsistent with this act or such general rules.
Any zoning resolution of the board of county commissioners may provide
that the board of adjustment may in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate principles, standards, rules, conditions and safeguards set forth in the
zoning resolution, make special exceptions to the terms of the zoning regulations in harmony with their general purpose and intent. The commissioners
may also authorize the board of adjustment to interpret the zoning maps and
pass upon disputed questions of lot lines or district boundary lines or similar
questions, as they may arise in the administration of the zoning regulations.
Meetings of the board of adjustment shall be held at the call of the chairman
and at such other times as the board in its rules of procedure may specify. The
chairman or in his absence the acting chairman, may administer oaths and
compel the attendance of witnesses. All meetings of the board of adjustment
shall be open to the public. The board shall keep minutes of its proceedings
showing the vote of each member upon each question, or if absent or failing to
vote, indicating such fact, and shall keep records of its examinations and other
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